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When innovating, an organization needs to be capable of (1) exploring problem 
definition spaces and (2) exploiting them. The processes in which both activities unfold, 
display paradoxical characteristics which can be addressed by adopting ambidextrous 
organizational forms. Analyzing underlying value dynamics indicate that such forms 
will only be sustainable to the extent that cross-fertilization between both types of 
activity is achieved. These findings underscore the relevancy of interface management 








‘A system – any system, economic or other – that at every given point of time 
fully utilizes its possibilities to the best advantage may yet in the long run be inferior to 
a system that does so at no given point of time, because the latter’s failure to do so may 
be a condition for the level or speed of long-run performance’ (J. Schumpeter, The 
process of Creative Destruction, p.83). 
 
Innovation has long been acknowledged as crucial for the long term survival and 
growth of the firm; at the same time technological innovation can be seen as one of the 
critical driving forces behind elevating the economic well-being of people and nations 
(Schumpeter, 1934; Tushman, Anderson & O’Reilly, 1997). However, organizing for 
innovation does not present itself as a straightforward exercise (Van de Ven, et al. 
1989). The complexities entailed when designing and implementing a sound innovation 
strategy can be directly related to the multitude of objectives comprised in such a 
strategy. The notions of incremental versus radical innovation (Dosi, 1982; McDermott 
and O’Connor, 2002), innovation as continuous improvement through learning by doing 
versus innovation as creative destruction (Arrow, 1962; Solow, 1997; Abernathy and 
Utterback, 1978; Anderson and Tushman, 1991; Bower and Christensen, 1995), 
flexibility to keep innovation options open versus commitment to well-defined 
innovation pathways (Ghemawat, 1991), divergent versus convergent behavior (Van de 
Ven et al.,1999), exploitation versus exploration (March, 1991) or path creation versus 
path dependence (Garud and Karnoe, 2001), are at the core of the dualities being 
outlined. 
 
As such, organizations trying to achieve both types of activities are being 
confronted with multiple, often contradictory demands imposing upon organizations the 
challenge of reconciling paradoxical requirements (Leonard-Barton, 1992, Dougherty, 
1996, Benner & Tushman, 2003).  
 
Within the next section we further illuminate the dynamics underlying the 
multitude of innovation objectives and their implications for organizing the variety of 
innovation activities implied. This will bring us to the ideas on organizing by means of 
semi- or quasi-structures (Schoonhoven & Jellinek, 1990; Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997) 
and ambidextrous organizational forms (Tushman M., Anderson P. and O’Reilly C., 
1997, Benner & Tushman, 2003; O’Reilly & Tushman, 2004). At the same time, it can 
be noted that ambidexterity implies the simultaneous presence of different activities, 
coinciding with differences in technology and market maturation. Financial returns will 
inevitably reflect this diversified allocation pattern, leading to the observation that such 
firms might be ‘inferior’ – in terms of value creation - to focused firms who concentrate 
on the most lucrative part of the technology life cycle. This then becomes the central 
point we want to address within this contribution: which are the prerequisites and 
conditions under which diversified firms of an ambidextrous nature are sustainable?  
 
We will address this question by developing a formal value creation model. This 
model relates value creation to technology and market maturity, while at the same time 
cost and benefits for ambidextrous firms are modelled in a formal way. Approaching the 
  3 
dynamics at play in such an analytical way clarifies the impact of antecedents on value 
creation which is seen as the most relevant criterion to assess sustainability. We will 
conclude this contribution by discussing the managerial implications of the results 
obtained and by outlining some issues for further research.  
 
The dual nature of innovation  
 
The challenges organizations face when simultaneously striving to achieve 
innovation of a more incremental and radical nature, can be traced back to the social 
dynamics in which both types of activities – i.e. exploration and exploitation – unfold. 
Indeed, within the extant literature on organizing and managing innovation activities, 
the multiple roles of communication and interaction have been focal points of attention. 
The seminal study of Pelz and Andrews on scientists and engineers concluded in the 
late 1960s with respect to communication: ‘the more the better’ (Pelz and  Andrews, 
1967; p 52). Likewise, the influential work of Thomas Allen (1977) underscored the 
importance of communication in relation to effectiveness within innovative 
environments. Interaction turns out to be of major importance when designing and 
implementing suitable problem definition and problem solving strategies. Those 
findings have been further corroborated and refined by numerous studies addressing the 
importance and the role of communication within R&D and innovation settings. 
Important contributions include – amongst others – the work of Allen (1966, 1977), 
Tushman (1977, 1978a,b), Tushman and Katz (1980), Katz and Allen (1986), Ring and 
Van de Ven (1989), Angle (1989) and Ancona and Caldwell (1992a,b). The influential 
work of Nonaka, and Takeuchi again emphasizes the crucial and central role interaction 
and collaboration play in the context of knowledge creation processes (Nonaka 1990; 
Nonaka 1994; Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995). Likewise, the overview on new product 
development processes developed by Brown and Eisenhardt (1995) assigns a central 
role to communication and interaction, irrespective of the research perspective 
considered.  
 
However, some of the findings originating from this research stream indicate 
that the role and impact of communication and interaction is not without its 
particularities. Allen (1977) advanced the notion of gatekeepers in order to explain why 
more communication with external partners did not always translate into better 
performance. Dougherty (1992) argued that the presence of ‘interpretive barriers’ can be 
seen as one of the main difficulties cross-functional R&D teams face. Sub-optimal 
performance results from not being able to transcend such differences. Ancona and 
Caldwell (1992a) were confronted with puzzling relationships between communication 
patterns, team composition and the performance of R&D teams. Likewise Fiol (1994) 
and more recently Keller (2001) have pointed out that functional diversity is beneficial 
for technical quality but is at the same time associated with diminishing levels of group 
cohesiveness. 
 
These puzzling findings can be better understood by acknowledging the dual 
role interaction can – and should – play in relation to knowledge creation, a 
phenomenon present in any innovative trajectory. This dual role can be related to the 
distinction made by March (1991) between exploitation and exploration. Whereas 
exploitation refers to activities such as ‘refinement, efficiency, selection and 
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implementation’, exploration is best captured by notions like ‘search, variation, 
experimentation and discovery’ (March, o.c.,p.102). Strong similarities can be noticed 
with the notions of divergent and convergent behaviour as outlined by Van de Ven, 
Polley, Garud and Venkatraman (1999). The social dynamics in which both types of 
activities are embedded not only expose characteristics of a different, but even of a 
paradoxical nature. Exploitation benefits from homogeneity, whereas exploration 
presupposes heterogeneity; exploitation thrives on consensus and can be seen as identity 
confirming, while exploration implies conflict and a redefinition of identities.  
 
The dual and paradoxical nature of innovation  
 
Exploitation.  Joint and integrated efforts are needed in order to fill in the 
‘missing bits, bytes and links’ of information during processes of knowledge creation. 
As Pelz and Andrews already remarked: ‘frequent contacts and interaction are 
beneficial when it comes to solving problems by adding pieces to the puzzle or by 
detecting errors one overlooks because of being too engrossed with the problem at 
hand’. (o.c. p.52). Faced with (difficult) problems, people start to work and to discuss 
with each another. This behaviour generates an inherently social process that results in 
and benefits from interaction.  In a more technical sense, one might state that interaction 
is instrumental in handling uncertainty. In line with the work of Schrader, Riggs and 
Smith (1993), we use a definition of uncertainty as ‘a characteristic of a situation in 
which the problem solver considers the structure of the problem (including the set of 
relevant variables) as given but is dissatisfied with his or her knowledge of the values of 
these variables’. As R&D professionals and their teams are continuously confronted 
with situations characterised by high levels of uncertainty, the ability to involve 
knowledgeable colleagues in this endeavour is beneficial for the innovation processes. 
This has been abundantly illustrated by numerous scholars (see for instance Allen, 
1977; Tushman and  Katz, 1980; Tushman, 1978; Van de Ven et al., 1989; Brown and  
Eisenhardt, 1995; Orr, 1996; Brown and  Duguid, 1991, 2000). 
 
Exploration. However, joint activity does not limit itself to filling in ‘missing 
bits, bytes and links’. New product development processes aim at creating novel 
products, processes and/or services. Here too, interaction plays a major role. As pointed 
out by Pelz and Andrews, contacts can be useful to provide intellectual stimulation and 
hence to generate new ideas: ‘jostling a man out of his old ways of thinking about 
things’ (o.c., p. 52 & 53). Schön (1963) drew our attention to the fact that novel 
solutions and insights stem from problem-defining and problem-solving interaction 
sequences, whereby multiple opinions and viewpoints become integrated into a new 
synthesis or artifact. Likewise, work within the domain of sociology of science and 
technology points to the social dynamics in which the developmental processes of new 
scientific knowledge and/or technological artifacts are embedded, including their 
conflicting nature (Fleck, 1934; Kuhn, 1962; Mulkay, 1968; Ben-David and Collins 
1966; Bijker, 1996) Interaction during new product development processes thus implies 
generating and addressing the differences in opinion and interpretation between the 
actors involved and their translation into a novel synthesis. Stated otherwise, interaction 
is not only instrumental for reducing uncertainty but for handling ambiguity as well. 
Ambiguity implies an unclear situation with respect to the problem-definition and hence 
problem-solving space considered as relevant by the actors involved. In more formal 
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terms, ambiguity relates to ‘the need for determination at the level of the relationships 
between the variables and the problem-solving algorithm (level one) or even at the level 
of the relevant variables (level two)’ (Schrader, Riggs and Smith, 1993). Dealing with 
ambiguity ideally results in the genesis of a novel synthesis whereby the variety of ideas 
that prevail among a variety of involved actors are re-interpreted, re-negotiated and 
finally fused. In other words, handling ambiguity implies acknowledging and addressing 
differences in opinion about what might hold true or what might be relevant to consider 
or to integrate during certain development trajectories. As a consequence, ambiguity 
extends beyond the idea of information exchange in order to fill in gaps present in an 
existing framework; it relates directly to the creation of new frameworks or knowledge. 
Actors belonging to different communities are confronted with finding ways to handle a 
variety of beliefs, evaluation routines and enabling artifacts. In March’s terms, 
exploration as well as exploitation is – or should – be an intrinsic part of any truly 
innovative effort and is needed for any system in order to survive (March 1991).  
 
At the same time, it can be noted that both activities display (social) 
characteristics of an opposite nature. Within innovative settings, this phenomenon has 
been highlighted by the seminal study of Katz and Allen (1982) on the ‘Not Invented 
Here’ syndrome. Katz and Allen examined the relationship between average project 
member tenure and performance. The results of this classical study are well known: an 
initial increase in performance is followed by a strong decline after a period of three 
years during which project members have worked together. The initial growth in 
performance can be related to an improvement in cohesive working relationships and 
team building. However, developing better or more cohesive working relationships – 
based on a better appreciation of skills and capabilities – results in patterns and routines 
that ‘exhaust’ diversity over time. This phenomenon was raised by Festinger almost half 
a century ago: ‘The more cohesive the group, that is the more friendship ties there are 
within the group and the more active the process of communication which goes on in 
the group, the greater will be the effect of the process of communication in producing 
uniformity of attitudes, opinions and behavior’ (Festinger et al., 1960; p. 175). Katz 
(1997) pointed out that groups working together over longer time frames might evolve 
from healthy levels of self-reliance towards problematic levels of closed-mindedness 
whereby novel situations and approached are either ignored or forced into known 
categories. A pattern of increasing isolation sets in characterized by selective exposure; 
group members tend to communicate only with those whose ideas and outlooks are in 
accord with own interests, needs and attitudes.  
 
Similar phenomena have been amply documented within the innovation 
literature (see for instance, Stork, 1991; Moenaert & Souder, 1996; Moenaert & 
Caldries, 1996) as well as within the literature focusing on team effectiveness (for an 
overview based on team formation and effectiveness, see Bouwen and  Fry (1996) and 
Wheelan and  Hochberger (1996)). Likewise contributions related to the notion of trust 
as a necessary ingredient of collaborative relationships arrive at similar conclusions 
(e.g., MacAllister (1995), Lewicki and Bunker (1996)). Homogeneity and similarity are 
found to be crucial antecedents for developing trustworthy relationships. As for 
innovation projects, this introduces a paradoxical challenge. On the one hand, 
collaborative relationships are essential for addressing the uncertainty involved in a 
smooth and efficient way. On the other hand, the homogeneity implied is in sharp 
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contrast with the variety needed to arrive at novel solutions. Stated otherwise, divergent 
opinions and the conflicts they entail, are crucial for development teams in order to 
arrive at the creation of novel products and/or services.  
 
The central role of conflict for novelty to arise has been rigorously documented in 
the field of developmental psychology. Within this field, a range of scholars has been 
advancing the idea that knowledge creation is intrinsically a socio-cognitive process. 
Important contributions stem from Vygotsky (1978, 1986) and Luria (1971), while the 
work of Doise, Mugny and colleagues (1984; 1998) empirically demonstrated the 
central role of socio-cognitive conflict. Prominent findings relate to the absence of 
superior models in order for development to happen while at the same time conflict, i.e. 
the presence and hence the confrontation of different approaches, turns out to be 
essential to arrive at the integration into a new synthesis: ‘If social interaction is of 
particular importance ….for development, it is to the degree that socio-cognitive 
conflict arises.…’ (Doise and  Mugny, 1984, p. 101). Stated otherwise, in order to arrive 
at novel insights and knowledge, coordination or interaction between individuals is 
needed and should be characterized by conflict. Such conflict builds on opposing 
viewpoints and hence presupposes some heterogeneity
i.  
 
Insert Figure 1 around here 
 
Hence, innovation activities, by their very nature, display dual and paradoxical 
requirements in terms of interaction as table 1 summarizes. The polarities pertaining to 
the social dynamics in which exploitation versus exploration unfold, can be seen as one 
of the root causes of the paradoxical nature of innovation strategies firms are being 
confronted with (Schumpeter, 1939: Abernathy, 1991; Abernathy and Utterback, 1978; 
Anderson and Tushman, 1991; Ghemawat, 1991; Benner and Tushman, 2003). 
 
So, when designing and implementing innovation strategies, organizations need 
to find ways to handle those paradoxical requirements. At least this is, if they want to 
achieve objectives in line with exploration and exploitation simultaneously rather than 
sequentially.  
 
Handling paradoxical requirements when pursuing exploration and exploitation 
simultaneously: towards ambidextrous organizations. 
 
Paradoxes can be seen as situations in which contradictory elements operate 
simultaneously: this simultaneity results in situations in which choosing one side occurs 
at the expense of the other and vice versa (Hampden-Turner, 1990; Quinn and   
Cameron, 1988; Janssens and  Steyaert, 1999; Lewis, 2000). With respect to coping 
with paradoxical requirements, several strategies have been proposed (Poole and Van de 
Ven, 1988; Steyaert and Janssens, 1999). Within these strategies, separation of 
contradictory elements or activities by means of time and space figure prominently. 
These principles are to be found as well in the notions of semi- or quasi-structures 
(Schoonhoven and Jellinek, 1990; Brown and Eisenhardt, 1997) and ambidextrous 
organizations (Tushman, Anderson and O’Reilly, 1997; Benner and Tushman, 2003) 
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advanced to handle the paradoxical requirements encountered. Christensen and 
Overdorf (2000) advance the idea of complementing ‘traditional’ organisational 
practices, via the creation of new organizational structures, spinouts and acquisitions in 
order to achieve the exploration oriented objectives of an innovation strategy. To the 
extent that companies pursue at the same time objectives of a more exploitative nature, 
hybrid organisational forms will therefore become a necessity. This argument has been 
advanced explicitly and convincingly by Nadler and Tushman (1997) and Tushman, 
Anderson and O’Reilly (1997) when elaborating on the idea of ambidextrous 
organisations (Duncan, 1976). When facing the challenge of embracing incremental, 
architectural and radical innovation, the authors point to the relevance of designing 
inherently unstable organizations as the adequate organisational arrangements required 
for the different objectives are of an opposite nature. Such arrangements are 
complemented by the presence of a clear common vision within which they make sense. 
The presence of overarching concepts allows spanning a variety of perspectives and 
technical competencies, while at the same time having sufficient ‘mobilising’ power to 
result in joint action. At the same time, capabilities – at the senior management level – 
are required to balance the tensions presented
ii.  
 
Within such configurations, conflicting ingredients can co-exist by adopting 
organizational designs of a hybrid nature. As a consequence, innovation strategies entail 
the deployment of organizational arrangements of a heterogeneous nature.  
 
As ‘hybrid’ organizational forms imply the simultaneous presence of different 
activities - coinciding with differences in technology and market maturation - financial 
returns inevitably will reflect this diversified resource allocation pattern. Compared to 
organizations that focus (within a given time period) on the – at that moment – most 
lucrative part of the portfolio, hybrid organizations may tend to be inferior in terms of 
financial performance
iii. In addition, the idea of semi-structures or ambidextrous 
organizations is diametrically opposed to the notion of internal consistency that has 
dominated the literature on organizational design over the last decades (Mintzberg, 
1979; Miller & Friezen, 1986). Given such tendencies towards internal consistency, 
ambidextrous organizations imply additional resources as higher levels of managerial 
and organizational complexity are being introduced, Stated otherwise, hybrid or 
ambidextrous organizations face the risk, at least in the short term, of being 
outperformed by organizations with more focus.  
 
Hence the question whether and under which conditions ambidextrous 
organizations can indeed be sustainable becomes a pertinent one. Within this 
contribution we want to explore such antecedents and requisites by developing a set of 
premises that will allow simulating and hence assessing their effects on value creation, 
as we will explain within the next section.  
 
Methodological Approach: defining a formal value creation model.   
 
In order to clarify the nature of the prerequisites as well as the sustainability - 
i.e. relative performance when compared to focused firms –  of such ‘heterogeneous’ or 
‘ambidextrous’ organizations, we develop a rather simple set of premises, which will 
allow to model the value creation efforts of different types of firms.  
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These premises relate to 1) the technology life cycle affecting the amount of 
value created in a given time period; 2) the resources needed to organize and manage 
the diversity entailed within ambidextrous organizations; and finally 3) resources 
needed to enact the diversity present within such ambidextrous organizational forms (if 
chosen to do so).  
 
In the next paragraphs we will elaborate the different assumptions and their 
formal counterparts systematically. Given that certain relationships between constituting 
variables are of a recursive nature, we will opt in a next step for simulation to explore 
the issues raised (Law & Kelton,1991). Within the simulation analysis the comparison 
between ‘focused’ and ‘ambidextrous’ firms will be central. With respect to the latter, 
we will develop and compare several models. This variety coincides with differential 
emphasis on a) resource allocation patterns across the portfolio of 
products/technologies; b) efforts devoted to constructive gate-keeping activities or 
‘coupling’ (tight versus loose) and, finally c) the characteristics pertaining to 







Value creation reflecting technology life cycle positions.  
In order to model the value creation of firms, a Pearl-Reed curve is used to 
reflect differences related to the technological life cycle (Young, 1993, Martino, 1972).  
The formula for the Pearl-Reed curve is 
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We distinguish between four different stages within the technology life cycle: 
seed, growth, mature and decline. Using Rogers’ curve on the diffusion of innovation, 
these are the threshold values for each of these stages: 
 
Lifecycle stage  Threshold values 
Seed  From 0.01L to 0.16L 
Growth  From 0.16L to 0.84L 
Mature  From 0.84L and upwards  
Decline  From 0.999L and downwards 
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Combining these two building blocks, we come to the following model: 
) ( 1
a t b e
L
− − +  for the rising part of the curve 
) ' ( ' 1
a t b e
L




•  L = 10 (arbitrarily chosen) 
•  ‘a’ is determined by which starting point is chosen 
•  if the chosen stage is ‘seed’, ‘a’ takes the value for which the Pearl-Reed curve 
will be at .1% of its maximum 
•  if the chosen stage is ‘growth’, ‘a’ takes the value for which the Pearl-Reed 
curve will be at .16% of its maximum 
•  if the chosen stage is ‘mature’, ‘a’ takes the value for which the Pearl-Reed 
curve will be at .84% of its maximum 
•  if the chosen stage is ‘decline’, ‘a’ takes the value for which the (declining) 
Pearl-Reed curve will be at 0.99% of its maximum 
 
This approach – whereby a reflects different positions on the technology lifecycle – 
allows to continue with only b and b’ as parameters within the Pearl-Reed formula in 
further simulations. These remaining parameters b and b’ reflect the inclination of the 
curve, for the rising and sinking part of the Pearl-Reed curve respectively. When b 
increases, the upward part of the curve will become steeper; an increase in b’ results in a 
sharper decline for the sinking part of the curve.  
 
E.g. starting in the ‘growth’ stage, with b=0.3, decline setting in at t=50 with b’=0.2, the 
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The value created during any given time period is obtained by calculating the 
integral of the curve for the period under consideration and results in formula (1) 
(1)  
 
For focused firms, i.e. organizations that allocate 100% of their resources to one 

































) 40 ( 40
) (
  10 
firms, the overall value equals the weighted sum of the values obtained by the integral 
pertaining to the different technological stages outlined (seed, growth, maturity, 
decline). Weights reflect directly the resources allocated to either activity and are 
subject to simulation, ranging from 10%/90% to 90%/10% whereby a minimum level of 




Resource considerations/Costs encountered by ambidextrous firms.  
As argued above, ambidextrous firms are confronted with additional levels of 
organizational and managerial complexity (see in this respect Christensen, 1997; 
Sheremata, 2000).  A certain proportion of the added value created over time will be 
taken into account as cost and hence become deduced from the value total obtained by 
applying (1). The proportion applied ranges from 4 to 10% depending on the presence 
of different stages within the portfolio.  Seed activities as part of the portfolio are 
considered as implying more resources (5%) than mature or even declining activities 
(3%, 2% resp.). Moreover, based on the work of Christensen (1997), it seems plausible 
to assume a positive, exponential relationship between technological distance – as 
observed at any given time period between different parts of the organization – and the 
amount of complexity encountered. Finally, we assumed as well a – curvilinear – 
relationship between resource allocation patterns across different parts of the 
organization, and the managerial and organizational costs encountered. This relationship 
has been incorporated by means of an Herfindahl index, which increases the more 
resources are equally distributed. This results in the following formulas:    
) . ( 1 ) ( ) , ( dist techn h herfindahl g created value stages f cdiv ∗ ∗ =
 
period one in created value overall io im ig is
created value stages f
* ) % 2 % 3 % 4 % 5 (
) , (
∑ ∗ + ∑ ∗ + ∑ ∗ + ∑ ∗
=
 
   where is, ig, im and io are binary variables (0/1), indicating whether a 
‘seed’ stage, ‘growth’, ‘mature’ or ‘decline’ is present within the 
organizational portfolio in this period. 
∑ = 2 αi index Herfindahl  
() ) 1 2 2 ( 1 ) ( α α − + − = herfindahl g
 
e dist techn h
dist δ = ) . ( 1  
   ‘dist’ is either 0 (same stage), 1 (1 stage difference; e.g. seed-growth), 2, 
or 3, 
   δ= .135 (chosen so that at the greatest distance (3), this value is 50% 
higher than at the smallest distance (0)) 
 
Similarly, resources/costs for enactment are modelled with the same building 
blocks. However, the influence of the technological distance – as observed at any given 
time period between different parts of the organization – is in this case assumed to be a 
negative, exponential, relationship, implying that the larger the ‘technological’ distance 
the greater the willingness of the different parts of the organization to engage in mutual 
development. This results in the following formulas: 
) . ( ) ( ) , ( 2 dist techn h herfindahl g created value stages f cenact ∗ ∗ =  
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e dist techn h
dist ϑ − = ) . ( 2  
   dist is either 0, 1, 2, or 3,  
   θ = .231 (chosen so that at the greatest distance (3), this value is 50% 
lower than at the smallest distance (0)).  
 
Figure 2 summarizes the relationships outlined above.  
 




Table 1 summarizes the findings – in terms of value creation – for focused firms. 
As expected, differences in terms of position on the technology life cycle translate into 
differences in terms of overall value creation over one time period consisting of 40 
periods, with the mature stage resulting in the overall best performance. Increasing 
levels of b and b’ affects the overall value obtained, especially – and not surprisingly - 
for early and latter stages (seed and decline). It can also be noticed from table 1 that 
firms situating their activities within the mature part of the technological life cycle 
outperform all three other types of (focused) firms for values of b, b’ ranging from 0.1 
to 0.4. As such, this firm will be used as a ‘benchmark’ when comparing the 
performance of focused firms with ambidextrous firms. 
 
Insert Table 2 around here 
 
Within table 2, a comparison between such a focused firm and a ambidextrous 
firm combining mature activities (90%) with seed-activities can be found.  When 
looking at the first period only, the value differential after one period of 40 episodes 
becomes apparent (391,29 versus 359,06). As such, these observations are again, a 
logical consequence of the concepts introduced and their analytical counterparts.  
 
A logical next step consists of comparing focused and ambidextrous firms over 
longer time periods. Table 2 contains the findings for both the focused firm – starting 
with 100% of mature activities - and the ambidextrous firm, combining mature activities 
with seed-activities over three time periods, consisting each of 40 episodes. Given the 
initial start conditions, in the next periods, the focused firm will evolve towards 
maturity and decline, while the ambidextrous firm follows a similar thrust. Within this 
analysis, different levels of b’ have been introduced, ranging from 0,1 to 0,4 (higher 
levels of b’ would lead to decline rates similar to fashion items only). At the same time, 
b has been set at 0.2
iv.  
Insert Table 2 around here 
 
As table 2 makes clear, only when b’ exceeds 0, 15 ambidextrous firms of this 
nature outperform focused, mature firms. As such, this difference can be labelled as a 
‘portfolio effect’, which becomes stronger the steeper the decline of the value curve.  At 
this stage, only value creation is considered; when taking into account the additional 
costs encountered by the ambidextrous firm (see table 3) - stemming from managing 
and organizing the diversity present - the relative superiority of ambidextrous firms 
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(again, for b’>0, 15) disappears; only when b’ equals 0,4 a marginal difference in favour 
of ambidextrous firms is observed.  
 
Insert Table 3 around here 
 
Of course, and rightly so, it can be argued that the ambidextrous firm might 
benefit from more than merely the portfolio effect. Hence, in a next step, two scenarios 
relating to the degree of resource re-allocation flexibility are being introduced. Within a 
first scenario this flexibility is unlimited, resulting in a resource allocation pattern 
yielding the highest total revenue, with the only constraint that at least 10% of the 
resources are devoted to the ‘less performing’ part of the portfolio. Secondly, a more 
realistic scenario is being deployed whereby the organization is allowed to re-allocate 
5% of its resources per episode from period 2 onwards whereby shifts occur when one 
part of the portfolio is superior to the other.  
 
When comparing the findings of table 4 with the results obtained for focused 
firms in table2, the difference between focused and ambidextrous firms becomes more 
outspoken and in favour of ambidextrous firms.  In terms of value creation, we obtain 
differences ranging from almost 9% to 60% depending again on the level of b’. 
Bringing in the resource/cost implications of ambidextrous firms does not significantly 
alter this picture, as Table 5 makes clear. The difference between the two resource 
allocation scenario’s (‘without constraints’ and ‘gradually’) is marginal in terms of total 
value creation. Comparing both scenarios in terms of costs encountered, it can be 
noticed that gradually shifting implies higher costs, an effect due to the presence of the 
Herfindahl index within the resource equations.  
 
Insert Table 4 & 5 around here 
 
As such, a first important observation becomes prominent; ambidextrous firms 
might indeed outperform focused firms, but this clearly depends on two conditions or 
requisites; first the rate of decline of a certain technological regime affects the extent to 
which ambidextrous firms benefit from the presence of a portfolio of activities. Second, 
and yielding a far greater effect, the extent to which resources can become re-allocated 
across different parts of the portfolio affects the value differentials observed. This latter 
observation points our attention into the direction of the synergetic potential between 
different technologies, in this case in terms of deployment of resources/assets across 
different technologies. As will become clear in the next section, the notion of synergetic 
potential will manifest itself under other forms as well.  
 
Ambidextrous firms enacting synergies between exploitation and exploration 
 
Within the next calculations, we model the effect of enacting the diversity 
present within ambidextrous firms on value creation. In order to model such 
relationship, we assume that firms actively pursuing synergies between different parts of 
their organizations and the technological capabilities they embody are able to influence 
both b and L. Indeed, as argued above, reasons to pursue this type of ambidextrous firm 
can – and should - be found in creating additional value which compensates for 
adopting extended (investment) time frames and for the increase in complexity 
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encountered. To the extent that ambidextrous firms are able to do so, this result in a 
superior performance compared to ambidextrous firms which do not enact the diversity 
present.  
 
Table 6 summarizes the findings for two different resource configurations; 
ambidextrous firms focusing on mature or seed activities (90%) which they complement 
with seed or mature activities (10%). Within table 6 net value creation is being depicted 
(i.e. value minus costs encountered) both in absolute terms (upper half) and expressed 
as a proportion of the value obtained by the most performing focused firm, i.e. a firm 
which devotes all its resources to mature activities (lower half).  
 
Insert Table 6 around here 
 
As the left side of table 6 makes clear, ambidextrous, enacting, firms are able to 
outperform – within one given time period consisting of 40 episodes – their focused 
counterpart, as soon as L increases with more than 10 % (in absolute terms: +1) or when 
L increases with 10% and b increases with +0,1. Moreover, even a ambidextrous firm 
with a portfolio characterised by 90% seed and 10% mature activities, turns out to be 
able to outperform a focused firm within one time period, if L doubles (in absolute 
terms + 10) and when b increases additionally with 0.2
v. 
 
Finally, when bringing in resource allocation flexibility and three time periods, 
the findings obtained so far start to reinforce each other leading to much more 
interesting perspectives for ambidextrous, enacting firms. Table 7 reports the findings 
obtained in this respect. The net value creation – over three time periods, each 
consisting of 40 episodes – of an enacting firm, able to re-allocate resources gradually, 
and starting with 90% of mature activities (combined with 10% of seed activities) 
outperforms the most performing focused firm in all cases. The lower half of the table 
indicates the proportional difference with such a focused firm (100% mature activities). 
A more systematic analysis even reveals that – in the case of no positive effect on L, 
ambidextrous firms can outperform mature focused firms, if b > 0.05 and the portfolio 
includes 70% mature activities. When additionally L increases by 1, ambidextrous, 
enacting firms, starting with a portfolio with 40% mature activities (and hence 60% 




Conclusions and suggestions for further research.  
 
Our findings reveal that – under certain conditions – ambidextrous firms can 
indeed take on sustainable forms whereby sustainability is defined as resulting in overall 
value creation equal or superior to focused mature firms. In order for such a relative 
stronger performance to occur, different elements play a role: adopting longer time 
frames; being able to shift resources across different parts of the portfolio; and finally 
actively pursuing or enacting synergies which might affect both the inclination (b,b’) 
and the upper limit (L) of the value curve analyzed here.  
 
The most important impact on value is observed when synergies are being 
introduced. Synergies manifest themselves threefold: flexibility in terms of resource 
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allocation across activities, technological cross-fertilization affecting b or b’, and market 
development as reflected in L, which in its turn presupposes new applications and 
products resulting from cross-fertilization. While O’Reilly and Tushman (2004) recently 
added the idea of sharing resources to the characteristics of ambidextrous organizing, 
our analysis stresses the crucial role of cross-fertilization on the level of underlying 
technologies. As such, Rosenberg’s adagio ‘inside the black box’ turns out to be highly 
relevant for firms pursuing continuous innovation. At the same time, our findings are in 
line with the empirical observations made by Teece et al. (1994) and He and Wong 
(2004). The interaction effect of exploration and exploitation activities on economical 
performance observed within this latter study might be directly related to the cross-
fertilization dynamics outlined within this contribution. As such, these observations 
underscore the relevancy of further adopting interface management practices directed 
towards actively enacting synergies while at the same time attenuating the paradoxical 
tensions encountered. 
 
At the same time, the observations reported here are but a first effort to model 
the value dynamics underlying ambidextrous, innovating firms. Additional analysis and 
refinements seem relevant and are actually being pursued by the authors. Such 
refinements relate to introducing multiple allocation models (implying portfolio’s 
comprising more than just 2 activities); introducing market dynamics (see in this respect 
J. Sutton), as well as refining value creation and resource dynamics by including their 
unpredictable nature. Finally, empirical testing of the dynamics and relationships 
outlined in order to refine them seems highly appropriate.  
 
  15 
References:  
•  Abernathy W. (1991) The productivity dilemma. Baltimore, John Hopkins University Press.   
•  Abernathy W. and Utterback, J. (1978) Patterns of industrial innovation. Technology Review, 7, 
40-47.  
•  Allen, T. (1966) ‘Studies Of The Problem-Solving Process In Engineering Design’ IEEE 
Transactions On Engineering Management, 13, 386-397. 
•  Allen, T. (1977) Managing The Flow Of Technology. MIT Press. 
•  Ancona, D. and  Caldwell, D. (1992a) ‘Demography And Design: Predictors Of New Product 
Team Performance.’ Organization Science, 3, 3, 321. 
•  Ancona, D. and  Caldwell, D. (1992b) ‘Bridging The Boundary: External Activity And 
Performance In Organizational Teams.’ Administrative Science Quarterly, 37, 634-665. 
•  Anderson, P. and Tushman M. (1991) Managing through cycles of Technological Change. 
Research/Technology Management, May/June, 26-31 
•  Arrow, K. (1962) The economic implications of learning by doing, Review of Economic Studies, 
28: 155-173. 
•  Bower, J.L. and Christensen, C.M. (1995) Disruptive Technologies: catching the wave. Harvard 
Business Review, 73: 43-54 (January-February). 
•  Ben-David, J. and Collins, R. (1966) Social factors in the origins of a new science: the case of 
psychology, American Sociological Review, 31, 451-465. 
•  Benner M.J. & Tushman M.L. (2003) Exploitation, exploration, and process management: The 
productivity dilemma revisited. The Academy of Management Review; 28 (2): 238-256 
•  Bijker W. (1995) Of bicycles, Bakelites and bulbs. towards a theory of socio-technical change. 
MIT Press. 
•  Bouwen R. and Fry R. (1996) Facilitating group development: interventions for a relational and 
contextual construction. In: West M. (ed.) Handbook of Work Group Psychology. Wiley and 
sons.  
•  Brown, S. L. & Eisenhardt, K. M. (1995) Product development: past research, present findings, 
and future directions. Academy of Management Review, 20 (2): 343-378. 
•  Brown, S. L. & Eisenhardt, K. M. (1997) The art of continuous change: linking complexity 
theory and time-paced evolution in relentlessly shifting organizations. Administrative Science 
Quarterly, 42 (1): 1-34. 
•  Christensen C. (1997) The innovator’s dilemma: When new technologies cause great firms to 
fail. Harvard Business Press. 
•  Christensen, C. M. & Overdorf, M. (2000) Meeting the challenge of disruptive change. Harvard 
Business Review, 78 (2): 66. 
•  Dosi G. (1982) Technological Paradigms and Technological Trajectories. Research Policy, 11, 
147-162.  
•  Doise, W. and  Mugny G. (1984) The social development of the intellect. Pergamon Pres. 
Oxford.  
•  Doise, W., Mugny G. and  Pérez J. (1998) The social construction of knowledge: social marking 
and socio-cognitive conflict. In Fleck U. (ed.) The Psychology of the Social. Cambridge 
University Press.  
•  Dougherty, D. (1992) ‘Interpretive Barriers To Successful Product Innovation In Large Firms.’ 
Organization Science, 3, 2, 179-201. 
•  Dougherty, D. (1996) Organizing for innovation. In: Cleggs, S. & Hardy, C. Handbook of 
organization studies: 424- 439 
•  Duncan, R.B. (1976) The ambidextrous organization: Designing dual structures for Innovation, 
in R.H. Kilmann, L.R. Pondy & D.P. Slevin (eds.), The management of organization design, 
New York: Elsevier North-Holland. 
•  Eisenhardt, K. M. and Tabrizi, B.N. (1995) ‘Accelerating Adaptive Processes: Product 
Innovation in The Global Computer Industry.’ Administrative Science Quarterly, 40. 
•  Festinger, L. , Schachter, S. and Back, K. (1960) Social Pressures In Informal Groups. Stanford 
University Press, California. 
•  Fiol, M. (1994) ‘Consensus, Diversity and Learning in Organizations.’ Organization Science, 5, 
3, 403-420. 
  16 
•  Fleck L. (1979, original text appeared in 1935) Genesis and development of a scientific fact. The 
university of Chicago Press.  
•  Garud  R. and Karnoe P. (2001) Path Dependency and Creation. LEA Publishers.  
•  Ghemawat (1991). Flexibility and Commitment: The Dynamics of Strategy, New York: Free 
Press 
•  Hampden-Turner, C. (1990) Charting The Corporate Mind. Free Press, Oxford, UK. 
•  He, Z-L and Wong P-K (2004) Exploration vs. Exploitation: An empirical Test of the 
Ambidexterity Hypothesis. Organization Science, 15, 4, 481-494.  
•  Katz, R., ed. (1997) The Human Side of Managing Technological Innovation. Oxford University 
Press. 
•  Katz R. and Allen T. (1982) Investigating the Not Invented Here Syndrome: A look at the 
performance, tenure and communication patterns of 50 R&D project groups. R&D Management, 
12,1, 9-17. 
•  Keller, R. (2001) Cross-functional project groups in Research and New Product Development; 
Diversity, Communications, Job Stress and Outcomes. The Academy of Management Journal, 3, 
547-55. 
•  Kuhn, T.S. (1962) The Structure Of Scientific Revolutions. University of Chicago Press. 
•  Law A. & Kelton D. (1991) Simulation Modeling and Analysis. McGraw-Hill, New York. 
•  Leonard-Barton, D. (1992) Core capabilities and core rigidities: A paradox in managing new 
product development. Strategic Management Journal, Summer Special Issue, 13: 111-125. 
•  Lewicki, R.J. and Bunker, B. (1996) ‘Developing And Maintaining Trust In Work 
Relationships.’ In: Kramer, R. and Tyler, T. Trust In Organisations; Frontiers Of Theory And 
Research. Sage, Thousand Oaks California. 
•  Lewis M. (2002) Exploring Paradox: Towards a more Comprehensive Guide. Academy of 
Management Review, 5, 760-776 
•  Lewis, M., Welsh M., Dehler G. and  Green S. (2002) Product development tensions: exploring 
contrasting styles of project management. Academy of Management Journal, 45, 3, 546-564. 
•  Luria A. (1971) Towards the problem of the historical nature of psychological processes. 
International journal of Psychology, 6, 4, 259-272.  
•  March J. (1991) Exploration and exploitation in organizational learning. Organization Science, 
2, 1. 
•  Martino, J. (1980).  ‘Technological Forecasting − An Overview’, Management Science, vol.26, 
No.1, January 1980, pp.28-33. 
•  McAllister, D. (1995) ‘Affect-And Cognition-Based Trust As Foundations For Interpersonal Co-
Operation In Organizations.’ Academy of Management Journal, 38, 1, 24-59. 
•  McDermott, C.M. and O’Connor, G.C. (2002) Managing radical innovation: an overview of 
emergent strategy issues. Journal of Product Innovation Management, 19: 424-438.  
•  Miller, P. and Friesen, D. (1984) Organisations: A Quantum View. Prentice-Hall. 
•  Mintzberg H. (1979).  The structuring of organizations: a synthesis of the research. Prentice 
Hall. 
•  Mulkay (1968) The Social Process Of Innovation. A Study In The Sociology Of Science. 
MacMillan Press. 
•  Nadler, D.A. and Tushman, M.L. (1997) Competing by design. The Power of Organizational 
Architecture. Oxford University Press.  
•  Nonaka, I. (1990) Redundant, Overlapping Organization; A Japanese Approach To Managing 
The Innovation Process. California Management Review, Spring 1990, 27-38. 
•  Nonaka, I. (1994) ‘A Dynamic Theory Of Organizational Knowledge Creation.’ Organization 
Science, 5, 1, 14-36. 
•  Nonaka, I. and Takeuchi, H. (1995). The Knowledge Creating Company. Oxford University 
Press. 
•  Orr, J.(1996) Talking About Machines: An Ethnography Of A Modern Job. Ithaca, NY, Cornell 
University Press. 
•  O’Reilly C & Tushman M. (2004) The Ambidextrous Organization. Harvard Business Review, 
April , 74-81 
•  Pelz, D.C. & Andrews, F.M. ( 1966). Scientists in Organisations. John Wiley and Sons, New 
York 
  17  18
•  Poole M.S. and Van de Ven A. (1989) Using paradox to build management and organization 
theories. Academy of Management Review, 14, 4, 562-578.  
•  Rogers E. (1962) The diffusion of Innovation. Free Press  
•  Rosenberg N. (1982) Inside the Black Box: Technology and Economics. Cambridge University 
Press 
•  Schön D. (1963) Invention and the evolution of ideas – The displacement of concepts. Tavistock 
Publications 
•  Schoonhoven Bird, C. and  Jellinek M. (1990) Dynamic tension in innovative, high technology 
firms: managing rapid technological change through organizational culture. Reprinted in: 
Managing strategic innovation and change. Ed. By Tushman M. and Anderson P. (1997). 
Oxford University Press.  
•  Schrader, S., Riggs, W.M. & Smith, R.P. (1993). ‘Choice Over Uncertainty And Ambiguity In 
Technical Problem Solving.’ Journal Of Engineering And Technology Management, 10. 
•  Schumpeter J. (1934) The Theory of Economic Development. Harvard University Press. 
Cambridge, Mass.   
•  Schumpeter, J.A. (1939) Business cycles: a theoretical, historical and statistical analysis of the 
capitalist process. New York: McGraw-Hill. 
•  Solow, R.M. (1997) Learning from ‘LEARNING BY DOING’. Stanford: Stanford University 
Press. 
•  Sheremata W. (2000) Centrifugal and Centripetal Forces in Radical New Product Development 
under Time Pressure. The Academy of Management Review, 25, 2, 389-408. 
•  Steyaert C. and  Janssens M. (1999) The world in two and a third way out. Scandinavian Journal 
of Management, 15, 121-139. 
•  Stork, D. (1991). ‘A Longitudinal Study Of Communication Networks: Emergence And 
Evolution In A New Research Organisation.’ Journal Of Engineering And Technology 
Management, 7, 177-196. 
•  Sutton J. (2001) Technology and Market Structure. MIT Press 
•  Teece, D., Rumelt R., Dosi G. & Winter S. (1994) Understanding corporate coherence. Journal 
of Economic Behaviour and Organizations, 23, 1-30. 
•  Tushman, M. & Katz, R. (1980) ‘External Communication And Project Performance: An 
Investigation Into The Role Of Gatekeepers.’ Management Science, 26, 11, 1071-1085. 
•  Tushman, M. (1977) ‘Special Boundary Roles In The Innovation Process.’ Administrative 
Science Quarterly, 22, 587-605. 
•  Tushman, M. (1978a) ‘Impacts Of Perceived Environmental Variability On Patterns Of Work 
Related Communication.’ Academy Of Management Journal, 22, 3, 482-500. 
•  Tushman, M. (1978b) ‘Technical Communication In R&D Laboratories: The Impact Of Project 
Work Characteristics.’ Academy Of Management Journal, 21, 4, 624-645. 
•  Tushman, M.L. & Anderson, P.C.  (1986) Technology discontinuities and organizational 
environments. Administrative Science Quarterly, 31: 439-465. 
•  Tushman, M.L., Anderson, P.C. & O’Reilly, C. (1997) Technology cycles, innovation streams, 
and ambidextrous organizations: organizational renewal through innovation streams and 
strategic change. In: Tushman, M. L. & Anderson, P.C. Managing strategic innovation and 
change: a collection of readings. NY: Oxford University Press. 
•  Van de Ven, A., Angle, H.and  Poole, M.S. (1989) Research On The Management Of 
Innovation: The Minnesota Studies. Harper & Row Publishers 
•  Van de Ven, A. Polley, D., Garud, R and Venkatraman S.(1999) The Innovation Journey. 
Oxford University Press. 
•  Vygotsky L. (1986) Thought and Language. MIT Press. 
•  Vygotsky, L. (1978) Mind in Society. The development of higher psychological processes. 
Harvard University Press 
•  Wernerfelt B. and Montgomery C. (1988) Tobin’s q and the Importance of Focus in Firm 
Performance. The American Economic Review, 246-250. 
•  Wheelan S. and Hochberger J. (1996) Validation studies of the group development 
questionnaire. Small Group Research, 27, 1, 143-170. 
•  Young, P. (1993).  ‘Technological Growth Curves.  A Competition of Forecasting Models’, 
Technological Forecasting and Social Change, Vol.44, pp.375-389. 
 Figure 1: The Dual and Paradoxical Nature of Interaction 
The Dual Nature of interaction in relation to Knowledge Creation Processes 
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Table 1: Value creation for Focused Firms depending on Life Cycle stage and variation of b, b’. 
 
          Seed Growth Mature Decline
b, b’=0.1  5,22        225,92 382,91 394,78
b, b’=0.2  69,06        308,46 391,29 330,94
b, b’=0.3  169,95        338,92 394,19 230,05
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Table 2: Total Value Creation for Focused and Diversified firms over 3 time periods 
(S = Seed; G= Growth; M=Mature; D=Decline) 
  Focused Firm  Diversified Firm (without shifts in resource allocation) 
  Portfolio  
characteristics 
b’=0,1 b’=0,15        b’=0,2 b’=0,4 Portfolio         
characteristics 
b’=0,1 b’=0,15 b’=0,2 b’=0,4
Period 1                       100%  M  391,29 391,29 391,29 391,29 10%S/90%M 359,06 359,06 359,06 359,06
                     
Period 2                         100%  D 394,77 377,43 330,92 172,68 10%G-M/90%D(*) 393,83 378,24 336,38 193,97
                     
Period 3   100% D  267,08  82,65  14,44  0  10%M-D/90%D  279,98  112,86  48,15  20,27 
                     
Total                          1053,12 851,37 736,65 563,97 1032,88 850,17 743,60 573,30
(*) During period 2, the diversified firm spans the growth phase to end already in the first episodes of Maturity at the end of period 2. 
Similar dynamics can be observed for Period 3, this time pertaining to Maturity and Decline.  
Table 3: Costs encountered by the Diversified Firm over 3 time periods  
 
 
Portfolio Characteristics  b’=0,1  b’=0,15  b’=0,2  b’=0,4 
10%S/90%M          6,23 6,23 6,23 6,23
10%G-M/90%D          4,17 4,01 3,58 2,11
10%M-D/90%D          2,1 0,88 0,37 0,16
Total    12,5  11,12  10,18  8,5
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Table 4: Total Value Creation for Diversified firms able to re-allocate resources over 3 time periods 
 
 
  Diversified Firm shifting resources without constraints  Diversified Firm shifting resources gradually (5% each time period) 
  Portfolio  
Characteristics 
b’=0,1      b’=0,15 b’=0,2 b’=0,4    Portfolio
Characteristics 
          b’=0,1 b’=0,15 b’=0,2 b’=0,4
Period 1  10%S/90%M  359,06  359,06  359,06  359,06  10%S/90%M  359,06  359,06  359,06  359,06 
                  
Period 2  G/M  397,27  395,22  390,23  373,00  G/M  396,64  393,15  386,64  353,43 
                  
Period 3   M/D  383,20  354,56  317,82  182,40  M/D  383,20  354,56  317,82  182,40 
                  
Total     1139,54  1108,84  1067,11  914,47    1138,91  1107,26  1063,53  894,90 
(S = Seed; G= Growth; M=Mature; D=Decline) 
 
 
Table 5: Costs encountered by the Diversified firm able to shift resources over 3 time periods 
 
 
  Diversified Firm shifting resources without constraints  Diversified Firm shifting resources gradually (5% each time 
period) 
  b’=0,1              b’=0,15 b’=0,2 b’=0,4 b’=0,1 b’=0,15 b’=0,2 b’=0,4
Period 1                     6,23 6,23 6,23 6,23 6,23 6,23 6,23 6,23
Period 2                     4,21 4,18 4,13 3,96 6,13 6,08 5,96 5,98
Period 3                       2,85 2,64 2,37 1,4 2,85 2,64 2,37 1,40
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Table 6:Comparing Net Value Creation of Enacting, Diversified firms with Focused Firms over One Time Period 
 
Mature/Seed = 90/10 
b = 0,20 
 
Mature/Seed = 10/90 
b = 0,20 
 
Net value creation in absolute terms 
  effect on b      effect on b 
effect 
on L 
+0.05           
                
+0.1  +0.15 +.2   effect 
on L 
+0.05 +0.1  +0.15 +.2
+0  356,82 362,44 366,57 369,63 +0  148,54 187,89 216,82 238,61
+1  388,38                 395,26 400,25 404,02 +1  159,46 203,28 235,57 259,91
+2  419,58                 427,71 433,70 438,18 +2  170,06 218,35 254,08 281,00
+3  450,42                 459,95 466,88 472,13 +3  180,32 233,18 272,32 301,84
+4  481,02                 491,94 499,92 505,89 +4  190,35 247,77 290,38 322,53
+5  511,39                 523,73 532,67 539,46 +5  200,14 262,13 308,22 343,03
+10  659,40                 679,48 694,16 705,21 +10  245,77 330,91 394,91 443,30
 
Net value creation expressed as % deviation from most performing focused firm 
(100%Mature) – One time period consisting of 40 episodes. 
  effect on b      effect on b 
effect 
on L 
+0.05                +0.1  +0.15 +.2 effect
on L 
+0.05 +0.1  +0.15 +.2
+0  -8,8 %  -7,4 %  -6,3 %  -5,5 %    +0  -62,0 % -52,0 %  -44,6 %  -39,0 %
+1  -0,7 %  1,0 %  2,3 %  3,3 %    +1  -59,2 % -48,0 %  -39,8 %  -33,6 %
+2  7,2 %  9,3 %  10,8 %  12,0 %    +2  -56,5 % -44,2 %  -35,1 %  -28,2 %
+3  15,1 %  17,5 %  19,3 %  20,7 %    +3  -53,9 % -40,4 %  -30,4 %  -22,9 %
+4  22,9 %  25,7 %  27,8 %  29,3 %    +4  -51,4 % -36,7 %  -25,8 %  -17,6 %
+5  30,7 %  33,8 %  36,1 %  37,9 %    +5  -48,9 % -33,0 %  -21,2 %  -12,3 %
+10  68,5 %  73,7 %  77,4 %  80,2 %    +10  -37,2 % -15,4 %  0,9 % 13,3 %
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Table 7: Comparing Net Value Creation of Enacting, Diversified firms with Focused Firms over three Time Periods 
 
M/S = 90/10 
b = 0,20 
value = 1123,7 
Net value creation in absolute terms 
  effect on b 
effect on L  +0.05  +0.1     
       
+0.15 +0.2
+0  1122,99 1129,02 1133,27 1136,34
+1  1231,08        1238,50 1243,62 1247,40
+2  1338,87        1347,60 1353,75 1358,23
+3  1446,29        1456,46 1463,60 1468,85
+4  1553,47        1565,10 1573,30 1579,28
+5  1660,32        1673,54 1682,72 1689,53
+10  2191,12        2212,47 2227,52 2238,63
 
Net value creation expressed as % deviation from most performing focused firm 
  effect on b 
effect on L  +0.05  +0.1     
       
+0.15 +0.2
+0  6,6% 7,2% 7,6% 7,9%
+1  16,9%        17,6% 18,1% 18,4%
+2  27,1%        28,0% 28,5% 29,0%
+3  37,3%        38,3% 39,0% 39,5%
+4  47,5%        48,6% 49,4% 50,0%
+5  57,7%        58,9% 59,8% 60,4%
+10  108,1%        110,1% 111,5% 112,6%
 
  
                                                 
i An observation which can be related directly to the relevancy of composing R&D teams in a cross-
functional or multidisciplinary manner as advanced repeatedly by scholars in the field (Cooper, 1979, 
Imai et al., 1985, Cooper & Kleinschmidt, 1987; Brown and Eisenhardt, 1996; Keller, 2001). 
ii Sheremata (2000) outlined the various organisational dimensions which can be instrumental for finding 
an equilibrium between the ‘centrifugal’ and ‘centripetal’ forces at work in those situations; including 
Decentralization, Reach, Free Flow of Information, Connectedness, Project Management influence, 
Cross-functional team influence and Temporal pacing 
iii See in this respect for instance the findings of Wernerfelt and Montgomery (1988). 
iv Given the start conditions, the total value over three periods will be influenced most by b’ as maturity 
and decline becomes relevant as from period 2. 
v In general terms; enacting firms are able to reduce the difference with focused firms considerably – by 
merely enacting within one time period (and hence no re-allocation of resources) - when 50% or more of 
the resources are allocated to seed activities. When more than 50% is attributed to mature activities, 
enacting firms outperform focused firms as soon as delta b= 0,05  and L increases by 1 (10%). 
vi These findings are not included in this paper, due to page constraints, however available from the 
authors upon request.  